Hosting and Cohabitation under the New Rent Law

A Legal Perspective in Light of Court of Cassation Rulings and the New Law

The old rent regime in Egypt underwent a fundamental legislative transformation during 2025. What had been presented during the first half of the year as a draft law to reorganize the relationship between landlords and tenants became binding law with the issuance of Law No. 164 of 2025 concerning Certain Provisions Relating to Premises Rent Laws and the Reorganization of the Relationship between Landlord and Tenant, published in the Official Gazette on 4 August 2025 and effective as of 5 August 2025.

Among the issues that have raised—and continue to raise—important practical questions are the concepts of hosting and cohabitation, given the consequences arising from distinguishing between them in relation to the legal status of an occupant of leased premises, the right to remain therein, and the extent to which statutory extension of the lease may be invoked.

Dr. Mostafa El Rouby previously addressed this issue in his article published in Al-Fagr Newspaper on 18 May 2025 under the title “Hosting and Cohabitation under the Draft New Rent Law.” At that time, the law was still at the draft stage. Today, following the issuance of Law No. 164 of 2025, these concepts must be reconsidered in light of the new legal framework.

First: What Is Meant by Hosting or Accommodation?

Hosting or accommodation is a concept whose contours have been shaped more by judicial rulings than by statutory provisions. It refers to the tenant allowing another person to reside with them in the leased premises by way of hospitality or tolerance, whether the stay is brief or continues for an extended period, while the original tenant retains possession of the premises and continues to benefit from them.

The Court of Cassation has consistently held that hosting is based on the absence of a tenancy relationship between the guest and the landlord, and indeed on the absence of any independent right of the guest even vis-à-vis the tenant. The guest’s residence remains derived from the original tenant’s right to use the premises.

Accordingly, the guest:

• Does not become a tenant merely by residing in the premises.
• Does not acquire an independent right against the landlord.
• Does not convert hosting into cohabitation merely because of the length of residence.
• Remains dependent on the continued legal status of the tenant who hosted them.

In Appeal No. 3150 of Judicial Year 61 – Session of 5 December 1991, the Court of Cassation held that accommodation by way of hosting remains based on tolerance and does not, regardless of how long it continues, turn into cohabitation entitling the guest to retain the dwelling for themselves.

When Does Hosting Become a Legal Problem?

The presence of another person with the tenant does not in itself constitute subletting or assignment of the lease. The nature of a residential lease allows the tenant to live with members of their family and with persons they choose to host.

The position differs, however, if it is established that the original tenant has actually relinquished the premises and left another person to enjoy them independently without a legal basis justifying that person’s presence.

In such a case, the decisive issue is not merely the presence of a third party in the apartment, but the reality of the situation: Does the tenant still reside in and use the premises, or has the tenant relinquished them and the other occupant become the independent beneficiary?

Depending on the circumstances of the case, the lease, and the applicable law, proof of relinquishment may raise the issue of assignment of the lease, subletting, or other statutory grounds for eviction.

Second: What Is Meant by Cohabitation?

Cohabitation differs fundamentally from hosting. It does not arise where a person enters the premises at a later stage as a guest, but rather—according to the settled jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation—where the person shares the residence with the tenant from the commencement of the tenancy relationship and such sharing continues without material interruption.

The Court of Cassation has held that cohabitation that creates for the resident a right to remain in the premises after the tenant’s death or departure requires that such cohabitation began at the commencement of the lease and continued without interruption.

An important application of this principle is Appeal No. 15982 of Judicial Year 75 – Session of 11 June 2006, in which the Court of Cassation confirmed that cohabitation may create for a beneficiary of the premises who is not among the relatives specified in the statutory extension rules a right to remain, provided that cohabitation from the commencement of the lease and its uninterrupted continuation are established.

The Court confirmed the same principle in Appeal No. 1345 of Judicial Year 72 – Session of 23 June 2003, emphasizing the need to examine the reality and continuity of residence from the beginning of the tenancy relationship.

Hosting and Cohabitation: Where Does the Real Difference Lie?

The distinction does not depend solely on kinship, nor solely on the duration of residence, but primarily on the time at which residence began, its nature, and the person’s legal position within the premises.

Third: Cohabitation Must Be Distinguished from Statutory Extension to Relatives

It is important not to confuse two relatively distinct concepts: cohabitation as developed by Court of Cassation jurisprudence, and statutory extension of the lease under premises rent laws.

Statutory extension was principally governed by Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 and the constitutional and legislative developments that subsequently affected it, and, with respect to the categories specified by law, was based on conditions including residence with the tenant in accordance with settled rules.

Cohabitation, by contrast, is a judicial concept that is broader in certain applications and has been associated with the familial and collective nature of residential leases and proof that the cohabitant shared the residence with the tenant from the commencement of the lease.

This distinction has become more important following the issuance of Law No. 164 of 2025 because the new law no longer permits the exceptional rent regime to continue indefinitely.

Fourth: What Did Law No. 164 of 2025 Change?

The most significant change introduced by the Law is not a redefinition of hosting or cohabitation, but rather the establishment of a time limit for old rent contracts subject to its provisions.

Article 2 provides for:

• Termination of residential lease contracts subject to the Law upon the expiry of seven years from the date on which it came into force.
• Termination of leases of premises rented to natural persons for non-residential purposes upon the expiry of five years from the date on which it came into force.
• The possibility of terminating the relationship earlier by mutual agreement of the parties.

Since the Law came into force on 5 August 2025, we are now dealing with a defined transitional period rather than a system of perpetual statutory extension as had been assumed in certain previous applications.

The Most Important Consequence: Cohabitation Is No Longer a Route to Indefinite Occupation

This is the most important point in interpreting the new Law.

Cohabitation continues to have legal significance during the transitional period in disputes concerning the status of the occupant, who has the right to benefit from the lease, or to whom the lease had already been extended before the Law was enacted. Previous Court of Cassation rulings also remain necessary for understanding facts and legal positions formed under the former laws.

However, following Law No. 164 of 2025, it can no longer be said that proof of cohabitation gives a person the right to remain in the unit indefinitely, because the lease itself is now subject to a mandatory statutory end date.

In other words: cohabitation may determine who holds the legal status during the transitional period, but it does not override the termination of the lease prescribed by Article 2.

Fifth: Eviction Cases Before the End of the Transitional Period

The Law did not merely provide for termination of leases at the end of the transitional period. Article 7 also introduced two circumstances that may lead to eviction before the expiry of that period, without prejudice to the grounds for eviction prescribed by Article 18 of Law No. 136 of 1981.

The two new circumstances are:

1. Leaving the premises closed for more than one year without justification.
2. Proof that the tenant or the person to whom the lease has been extended owns another unit capable of being used for the same purpose for which the leased premises were intended.

If the occupant refuses to vacate after one of the circumstances specified by law has arisen, the legislature permits the owner or landlord to apply to the Judge of Urgent Matters at the court within whose jurisdiction the property is located for an order evicting the person refusing to vacate, without prejudice to the right to claim compensation where appropriate.

The Law also permits the tenant or the person to whom the lease has been extended to bring substantive proceedings before the competent court, but filing such proceedings does not in itself suspend the order issued by the Judge of Urgent Matters.

Is Hosting Another Person a New Ground for Eviction?

No. Law No. 164 of 2025 does not provide that merely hosting another person in the premises constitutes an independent ground for eviction.

The principle established by the courts therefore remains important: a tenant rents a dwelling in order to reside there with their family and with those whom they choose to accommodate, provided that the tenant has not relinquished the premises and no transaction contrary to the law or the lease has arisen.

Accordingly, caution is required before treating every person residing in the premises whose name is not recorded in the lease as an “assignee” or “subtenant.” The matter requires examination of the reality of possession and residence and the degree of independence of the occupant from the original tenant.

Sixth: Alternative Housing… What Did the Law Actually Provide?

One of the most commonly misunderstood points is the assertion that the Law prevents the eviction of any tenant until the State provides alternative housing. Stated in these absolute terms, this is inaccurate.

Article 8 grants the tenant or the person to whom the lease has been extended, before the expiry of the transitional period, priority in applying for the allocation of a residential or non-residential unit from units available through the State, whether by lease or ownership, in accordance with the prescribed rules and conditions.

The application requires the submission of a declaration undertaking to vacate and surrender the leased premises once the allocation decision is issued and the alternative unit is received.

The Law also gave particular consideration to the original tenant of a residential unit whose lease was initially concluded directly with the owner or landlord, as well as that tenant’s spouse to whom the lease had been extended before the Law came into force. It provided that residential units must be allocated to them no later than one year before the expiry of the transitional period, in accordance with the prescribed system.

Cabinet Decree No. 53 of 2025 was subsequently issued to establish the rules, conditions, and procedures necessary for implementing Article 8, including different forms of allocation such as lease, lease-to-own, ownership through mortgage finance, cash payment, or installment payment depending on the conditions of each announcement.

Accordingly, alternative housing constitutes a social protection mechanism regulated by law, but it does not support the assertion of a general rule that eviction is impossible in all cases unless the State first provides an alternative unit.

Seventh: The Effect of the New Law on Pending Cohabitation Claims

A question may arise: What is the practical value of bringing an action to establish cohabitation today if old rent contracts will terminate at the end of the transitional period?

The answer is that establishing legal status continues to have important practical consequences during this period. It may determine:

• Who has the right to occupy the premises until the statutory period expires.
• The person to whom the landlord must address legal notices.
• Entitlement to benefit from Article 8 concerning alternative units where its conditions are satisfied.
• The defense available in eviction proceedings brought before the end of the transitional period.
• The person responsible for paying the new statutory rent.

However, the duration of this legal status is now governed by Law No. 164 of 2025.

Eighth: How Is Cohabitation Proven Before the Courts?

Cohabitation is a question of fact ultimately subject to the assessment of the trial court in light of the evidence and indicia presented, provided that the court’s inference is reasonable and supported by the case file.

Evidence that may play a role in proving residence, depending on the circumstances of each case, includes:

• The national identification card and the address recorded therein.
• Official correspondence addressed to the person at the premises.
• Old educational or employment documents.
• Official records.
• Testimony and indicia demonstrating actual residence.
• Expert reports or inspections where relevant to the dispute.
• Witness testimony.

No single document is sufficient in every case. Residence is a complex factual matter, and a person may be officially registered at a particular address without actually living there, and vice versa.

Does Marriage or Ownership of Another Residence Automatically Terminate Cohabitation?

Not every absence or change in personal circumstances automatically results in the loss of residence. What matters is what the court concludes from the reality of the circumstances and the intention underlying residence and any interruption thereof.

The Court of Cassation has confirmed that assessment of the intention to reside falls within the authority of the trial court, provided that its judgment is based on reasonable grounds leading logically to the conclusion reached.

Accordingly, broad propositions such as that marriage, travel, or temporary residence outside the premises always terminates the right should be avoided. Each case must be examined in light of its circumstances, documents, and the extent to which they demonstrate permanent abandonment of residence.

Ninth: Increase in Rental Value During the Transitional Period

In addition to terminating leases after a transitional period, Law No. 164 of 2025 reorganized the statutory rent.

For residential units, the Law linked the new value to the classification of the area as premium, middle-income, or economic. In premium areas, the rent was set at twenty times the existing statutory rent, subject to a minimum of EGP 1,000; in middle-income areas, at ten times the existing rent, subject to a minimum of EGP 400; and in economic areas, at ten times the existing rent, subject to a minimum of EGP 250.

For premises rented to natural persons for non-residential purposes, the statutory rental value became five times the existing rent.

The values determined under the Law increase by 15% annually.

These provisions also apply, as the case may be, to the tenant or the person to whom the lease has been extended, further increasing the importance of determining the legal status of the occupant during the transitional period.

Tenth: The Real Estate Impact of the Law Cannot Yet Be Assessed Definitively

The gradual termination of the exceptional rent regime is likely to return a number of units to market circulation and encourage some owners to maintain or redevelop their properties.

However, it would be inaccurate to state definitively that the Law will automatically reduce market rents or resolve the housing crisis, because the real estate market is affected by multiple factors, including land and construction costs, financing, income levels, demand, and geographical location.

The social impact of the Law will also differ from one category to another, which explains the legislature’s adoption of a relatively lengthy transitional period and its regulation of priority access to alternative State-provided units.

Practical Advice for Landlords

1. Do not assume that every person residing with the tenant is an assignee of the lease. The nature of the residence and the available evidence must first be determined.
2. Review the date of the lease and identify the persons who resided in the premises from its commencement before bringing an action denying cohabitation.
3. Document instances in which the unit is left closed if there is an intention to rely on Article 7 of the Law, and do not rely merely on unsupported assertions.
4. Verify whether the tenant owns an alternative unit legally and accurately before commencing eviction procedures.
5. Do not recover the premises by force or change the locks on your own initiative; the Law establishes a judicial route for eviction and removal.

Practical Advice for Tenants and Persons to Whom the Lease Has Been Extended

1. Determine your legal status precisely. Merely being present in the unit does not necessarily make you a tenant or a person entitled to statutory extension.
2. Retain old documents proving residence if you rely on cohabitation or statutory extension.
3. Comply with the statutory rental value and periodic increases to avoid creating an additional ground for dispute.
4. Follow the procedures for applying for an alternative unit if you are eligible and wish to benefit from Article 8.
5. Do not treat cohabitation as a means of remaining indefinitely, because Law No. 164 of 2025 has established an express time limit for leases subject to its provisions.

The Role of the Lawyer in Hosting and Cohabitation Disputes

Cohabitation and hosting disputes are among the cases that cannot easily be resolved by merely reading the lease, because the core of the dispute often concerns facts extending over decades.

Legal analysis should therefore begin by reconstructing the history of the premises: Who originally rented them? Who was living with the tenant when the lease began? Who left? Who returned? Did a previous statutory extension occur? And what was the effect of the constitutional and judicial rulings issued during that period?

Only after that should Law No. 164 of 2025 be applied to the legal status that has been established.

The Perspective of the Office of Dr. Mostafa El Rouby – Attorneys and Legal Consultants

The Office of Dr. Mostafa El Rouby – Attorneys and Legal Consultants believes that the issuance of Law No. 164 of 2025 does not eliminate the importance of the extensive jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation concerning hosting, cohabitation, and statutory extension, but it does change the future effect of that jurisprudence.

During the transitional period, courts will continue to need these principles in order to determine who occupies the premises on a lawful basis and who does not, but the ultimate result is now linked to a specific duration established by the legislature.

Legal work in this area includes:

• Reviewing old lease agreements and the chain of statutory extensions.
• Assessing evidence of residence and cohabitation.
• Examining cases involving hosting, assignment, and subletting.
• Bringing and conducting eviction proceedings or defending against them.
• Dealing with eviction orders provided for in Article 7.
• Providing advice regarding the new statutory rent and periodic increases.
• Examining legal positions relating to applications for alternative units.
• Drafting settlements and new agreements between landlords and tenants where an amicable solution is more appropriate.

Conclusion

For decades, the concepts of hosting and cohabitation remained among the most important issues in old rent disputes. The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation established a clear distinction between them: hosting is residence derived from the tenant’s status and does not grant the guest an independent right, whereas cohabitation requires—in its judicial origin—the sharing of the residence with the tenant from the commencement of the lease and the continuation of that sharing without interruption.

However, the issuance of Law No. 164 of 2025 created a new legal reality. The question is no longer merely: To whom does the lease extend? It has also become: How long does the lease itself continue?

The legislature answered this question by establishing a transitional period after which residential leases subject to the Law terminate after seven years, and leases of premises rented to natural persons for non-residential purposes terminate after five years, while also regulating rent, eviction cases, and alternative units during this period.

Accordingly, cohabitation does not disappear as a legal concept, but its function has changed: it may determine who holds the right in the premises during the transitional period, but it does not grant a right extending beyond the statutory termination date established by the Law.

This is the essence of the new balance that the legislature sought to establish between social considerations and the tenant’s right to an orderly transition from the old regime, on the one hand, and the owner’s right to recover their property after the expiry of the period prescribed by law, on the other.

Dr. Mostafa El Rouby Writes in Al-Fagr Newspaper – Hosting and Cohabitation under the Draft New Rent Law

Sources and References

• Information and Decision Support Center – Issuance of Law No. 164 of 2025
• State Information Service – Executive Procedures for Law No. 164 of 2025
• Appeal No. 3150 of Judicial Year 61 – Court of Cassation – 5 December 1991
• Appeal No. 15982 of Judicial Year 75 – Court of Cassation – 11 June 2006